



Defending Your Institution from Spear Phishing Attacks

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- A professional services firm with three distinct business lines
 - Wealth Advisory
 - Outsourcing
 - Audit, Tax, and Consulting
- More than 4,500 employees
- Offices coast to coast
- Serve more than 1,450 financial institutions



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Speaker Introduction

Randy Romes

- Principal with CLA's information security services group
- Consultant for more than 16 years
- Leads a team of technology and industry professionals
 providing IT audits and security assessments for clients in a
 wide range of industries and diverse operating environments.



Learning Objectives

- At the end of this session, you will be able to:
 - Discuss a three-pronged approach to defend your financial institution from spear phishing attacks
 - Identify an action plan to protect your organization from cybercrime
 - Recognize appropriate steps to take if you've fallen victim to fraud







Our perspective...

CliftonLarsonAllen

- -Started in 1953 with a goal of total client service
- Information Security offered as specialized service offering for over 20 years
 - ➤ Penetration testing
 - Vulnerability assessment
 - >IT/Cyber security risk assessments
 - >IT audit and compliance
 - ➤ Incident response and forensics
 - ➤ Security awareness training
 - ➤ Independent security consulting





Overview

- Hacker motivations and techniques
 - Current threats
 - Industry examples



Case studies

 Strategies and defensive measures to mitigate risks of phishing attacks



Cyber Fraud Risk Themes

- Hackers have "monetized" their activity
 - More sophisticated hacking
 - More "hands-on" effort
 - Smaller organizations targeted
 - Black market economy




Everyone is a target...

 Phishing is a root cause behind the majority of cyber fraud and hacking attacks



Cybercrime as an industry

- Suppliers
- Markets
- Service providers
 ("cybercrime as a service")
- Financing
- Trading systems
- Proliferation of business models







Criminal Specialization

- Coder
- MaaS
- Attacker
- Aggregator
- Carder/distributor
- Street level criminal





Largest Cyber Fraud Trends - Motivations

- Most common cyber fraud scenarios we see affecting our clients
 - Theft of PII and PFI
 - Theft of credit card information
 - Member and corporate account take overs
 - Ransomware





Black Market Economy - Theft of PFI and PII

Active campaigns involving targeted phishing and hacking focused on common/known vulnerabilities.

RETAIL

- Target/Home Depot
- Jimmy Johns/Goodwill

Higher Education

- University of Indiana
- Rockhurst University

Large Personnel Breaches

- OPM
- Blue Cross Primera

Health Care Systems

Community Health
 Systems



Account Takeovers – CATO

- Catholic church parish
- Hospice
- Regional bank
- Finance company
- Main Street newspaper stand
- Electrical contractor
- Utility company
- Industry trade association
- Rural hospital
- Mining company
- Credit Union (board members)







CATO Lawsuits – UCC

A payment order received by the [bank] is "effective as the order of the customer, whether or not authorized, if the security procedure is a commercially reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized payment orders, and the bank proves that it accepted the payment order in good faith and in compliance with the security procedure and any written agreement or instruction of the customer restricting acceptance of payment orders issued in the name of the customer."



CATO Lawsuits – UCC

- Electrical Contractor vs Bank
 - > \$300,000 stolen via ACH through CATO
 - Internet banking site was "down" DOS?
 - Contractor asserting bank processed bogus ACH file without any call back
- Escrow company vs Bank
 - > \$400,000 stolen via single wire through CATO
 - ♦ Escrow company passed on dual control offered by the bank
 - Court ruled in favor of bank
 - Company's attorneys failed to demonstrate bank's procedures were not commercially reasonable



Phishing – CATO – NACHA (ACH) Update





Phishing – CATO – NACHA (ACH) Update

- Employee clicked on a phishing email appearing to come from the National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA)
 - Embedded link resolves to a Russian IP address
- Employee's internet banking credentials were compromised
- Employee's browser was hacked
 - Injected with malicious HTML registry setting
 - Pop-up asks for additional information when visiting banking site
 - > Employee also received call from supporting actor in attack



Phishing – CATO – NACHA (ACH) Update

- Lessons learned
 - Weak/missing filtering capabilities
 - Lack of employee awareness
 - Excessive user access (operating system)
 - No segregation of duties (application)
 - No incident response plan
 - IT indicated the employees system was "clean" –
 this was not the case (training/awareness)
 - Lack of log retention/server logging not enabled
 - System was powered off



CATO Defensive Measures

Authentication:

- Multi-layer authentication
- Multi-factor authentication
- Out of band authentication



- Positive pay
- ACH block and filter
- IP address filtering

Monitoring:

- Dual control
- Defined processes for payments
- Activity monitoring / Anomaly detection
- Manual vs. Automated controls







Hospital ransomware: A chilling wakeup call

Hollywood Presbyterian was forced to pay up, just like everyone else.








http://www.engadget.com/2016/02/19/hospital-ransomware-a-chilling-wake-up-call/












 Malware encrypts everything it can interact with











- Filtering capabilities
- Users that are aware and savvy
- Minimized user access
- Working backups are critical...
- See appendix...








Phishing Examples







Email Phishing – Targeted Attack



Greetings,

A recent group of viruses have been released which put systems at risk. These viruses exploit vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer an personal information. The viruses targeting Microsoft Outlook are particularly dangerous because they only require the recipient to

Anyone running Microsoft Windows 2000 or XP should download the following patch and install it immediately, to patch the vulne

Instructions:

- 1. Click on this link https://microsoft.issgs.net/msupdate.php?id=bWphY2tzb25AbGFyc29uYWxsZW4uY29tCg=
- 2. On the resulting web page, click the "Download" button.
- 3. A dialog box will pop up (you may need pop-ups enabled). Start the installation immediately by clicking the "Run" button. The is







Email Phishing – Targeted Attack

Randall J. Romes [rromes@larsonallen.com]

Thanks,

Randall J. Romes

From: Microsoft Security Info [mailto:security@microsoft.com]

Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2008 8:57 AM

To: Romes, Randall J.

Subject: Strong Password Checking Tool

Greetings,


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
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Phishing Examples





Persuasion Attack – CEO Impersonation

- Email from CEO to CFO/Controller
 - CEO Gmail account has been compromised
 - CEO's email is spoofed (faked)
- Email does NOT contain suspicious links

- Email looks very legitimate
 - Attackers are performing reconnaissance on their targets
 - Use social media to know when CEO isn't available (e.g. vacation)



Persuasion Attack – CEO Impersonation

- CEO asks the CFO...
- Common mistakes
 - 1. Use of private email
 - 2. "Don't tell anyone"

Omaha's loses \$17 million after spearphishing attack

Fraudsters convinced an Omaha company to send \$17.2 million to a bank in China



Safeguards

- 1. Never use email for sole method of authorization
- 2. Ensure recipient has VERBALLY validated with "source" of email for financial transactions

Fraudsters targeting an Omaha company last summer used extremely well-targeted emails to convince its controller to send a series of wires totaling \$17.2 million to a bank in China.

First, there were emails, supposedly from the CEO, saying that was buying a company in China. The emails weren't from the CEO's official email address, and, moreover, warned the controller not to communicate about the deal through other channels "in order for us not to infringe SEC regulations."

The emails also instructed the controller to get the wire instructions from an actual employee of the company's actual accounting firm.

Plus, the phone number provided in the email was answered by someone with the right name.

MORE ON CSO: How to spot a phishing email

Since was, in fact, discussing expanding in China, the controller fell for the emails and sent off the money.

http://www.csoonline.com/article/2884339/malware-cybercrime/omahas-scoular-co-loses-17-million-after-spearphishing-attack.html






Phishing Emails - Malicious Office Document

Attackers are embedding malware in Office documents (Macros)

Enabling Macros on the document allows the malicious code to run





Phishing Emails - Malicious Office Document

- Remediation
 - Don't open attachments from unknown sources
 - Don't open attachments you didn't expect








Pre-text Phone Calls (Phishing by phone)

- "Hi, this is Randy from Fiserv users support. I am working with Dave, and I need your help..."
 - Name dropping → Establish a rapport
 - Ask for help
 - Inject some techno-babble
- "I need you to visit the Microsoft Update site to download and install a security patch. Do you have 3 minutes to help me out?"
- Schemes result in losses from Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) accounts, fraudulent ACH transactions,...




Email Phishing – Targeted Attack





Email Phishing – Targeted Attack









Key Defensive Strategies

Strategies

Our information security strategy should have the following objectives:

Users who are aware and savvy

Networks that are resistant to malware and attacks



 Be Prepared... Monitoring, Incident Response, Testing, and Validation





Strategies to Combat Social Engineering

(Ongoing) user awareness training

- SANS First Five Layers "behind the people"
 - 1. Secure/Standard Configurations (hardening)
 - 2. Critical Patches Operating Systems
 - 3. Critical Patches Applications
 - 4. Application White Listing
 - 5. Minimized user access rights
 - > No browsing/email with admin rights





Strategies to Mitigate Phishing Risks

- Filtering capabilities (white listing)
- Users who are aware and savvy
- Minimized user access rights
- Networks that are resistant to malware and attacks
- Preparedness... Monitoring, Alerting, and Incident Response Capabilities
- Working, Validated Backup and Restore Capabilities





Call To Action

Policies to set foundation


Train your users

Thoroughly assess your risks

Three R's: Recognize, React, Respond

Thoroughly validate your controls

- High expectations of your vendors
- Penetration testing
- Application testing
- Vulnerability scanning
- Social engineering testing



Questions?













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CLAconnect.com









Resources – Hardening Checklists

Hardening checklists from vendors

- CIS offers vendor-neutral hardening resources <u>http://www.cisecurity.org/</u>
- Microsoft Security Checklists

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/archive/security/chklist/default.mspx?mfr=true http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd366061.aspx

Most of these will be from the "BIG" software and hardware providers



Industry Breach Analysis Security Reports

- Intrusion Analysis: TrustWave (Annual)
 - https://www.trustwave.com/whitePapers.php
- Intrusion Analysis: Verizon Business Services (Annual)
 - http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/



Ransomware Defensive Measures

- Remove the connection
 - Reduce threat to network
 - Reduce remote connection
 - Eliminate risk of data loss
- Call IT helpdesk
- Describe what you were doing
 - Especially email
- Wait for instructions







Ransomware Safeguards

- Software Restriction Policies are one good way to prevent this.
 - https://technet.microsoft.com/enus/library/cc759648(v=ws.10).aspx
 - We can send some example policies if needed. There are a few clients who are going this route.



Ransomware Safeguards

- Stopping .exe launch from AppData locations and \$temp\$.
 - Malware we were looking at the other day dropped .bat,
 .vbs, and .exe in appdata folder.
 - Restricting what applications can run from appdata/temp is very important.
 - Webroot had a good write up on this a few days ago.
 - http://www.webroot.com/blog/2016/02/22/locky-ransomware/
 - ♦ Apparently the executable only runs in \$temp\$. Restricting what gets run from there that would help.

Ransomware Safeguards

- Do an audit of file permissions for where backups are stored.
 - Identify what users could encrypt backups if they were to become infected.
 - Generally, you would want the location very restrictive read only access even for most administrators.
 - Backups should be done with a service account.
 - Users should not have access to the backup location.
 - You could also restrict the backup network access temporally similar to a bank vault.
 - ♦ That could be done with a simple script that would disable the port during the day and then reenable just before the backup starts.

